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Once again, in the past week a power struggle within the contra leadership caused consternation
among US officials. As in the past, one side is led by Adolfo Calero. Prior to the reorganization of the
contras last year into the umbrella organization, the Nicaraguan Resistance, Calero was the civilian
chief of the contra's main military force, the FDN. Calero reportedly survived previous leadership
struggles, largely because of his tie to the FDN, which is based in Honduras. The other side of the
contending factions is led by top contra military leader and former National Guard officer, Enrique
Bermudez, and Aristides Sanchez, a former contra military logistics chief and close Bermudez
ally. Sanchez and Calero are on the five-member directorate of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Calero
headed the contra delegation that signed the March 23 Sapoa accords and led a delegation to
follow-up talks in Managua on the weekend of April 16. According to contra sources cited by the
Washington Post, Sanchez who also signed the accords in Sapoa, expressed reservations thereafter
and did not go to Managua. Bermudez, who did not attend the Sapoa meetings, has informed
contra exiles in Miami that the Sapoa accords were "badly negotiated." Unnamed contra officials
cited by the Post said one sign of the struggle was the recent reassignment of two contra field
commanders who participated in the Sapoa negotiations. [Nicaraguan government officials were
aware of divisions among contra leaders. In protesting the Reagan administration's decision to begin
nonlethal aid shipments to contra camps in Honduras, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said on
April 22 that "with this move the United States is strengthening...the faction of Enrique Bermudez
that opposes the accords and is weakening the directorate that has been working in favor of the
accords."] According to unnamed contra and US officials cited by the New York Times (04/26/88),
contra leaders resolved their differences in Honduras over the weekend. At present, according to the
officials, contra military commanders appear to support further negotiations with the Nicaraguan
government. Meanwhile, they have placed "strict limits on what concessions they will make."
Contra and US officials said the contra alliance was jeopardized when Calero tried to foment a coup
against Bermudez in an effort to gain power and dominate the negotiations in Managua. Calero's
plans were reportedly dashed during a weekend meeting in Honduras attended by the contra
directorate, Bermudez and other top military commanders. Calero had reportedly persuaded a few
younger commanders to try and oust Bermudez, transforming Calero into "supreme commander."
The cited officials said Calero had told the commanders that he had contacts and money to purchase
weapons for them and see that the war effort remained viable. Next, Calero's strategy as related
to the commanders was to "string the Sandinistas along" in protracted ceasefire talks and then
rely on a victory by the Republicans in the US presidential campaign to eventually resume military
aid to the contras. The sources said other contra officials supported Bermudez, arguing that if he
were ousted now military cohesion would disintegrate. Further, the CIA reportedly "sat on Calero
hard," said a US official. Contra military and civilian officials then removed four contra officials
in Honduras who supported Calero. Bermudez reportedly told Calero that he would never trust
him again. According to the Times, a shaky alliance emerged during the weekend: Adolfo Cesar,
considered the most politically liberal contra leader, supported Bermudez to derail Calero. Cesar
is thus now reliant on conservative military commanders to keep Calero under control. A new
contra military representative is expected at the ceasefire talks in Managua to be resumed April
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28-30, Juan Ramon Rivas Romero. Rivas, a former National Guard sergeant, has fought with the
contras for seven years during which he formed and led their major combat unit, the Jorge Salazar
Regional Force. He reportedly will travel to Managua as Bermudez's personal representative. On
April 22 in Buenos Aires, during an hour-long meeting with Argentine President Raul Alfonsin,
Nicaraguan Education Minister Fernando Cardenal discussed the progress of ceasefire talks with
the contras. Cardenal said he had doubts about the possibility of concluding a permanent ceasefire
agreement in the next round beginning on April 28 because Bermudez is not interested in a peace
accord. The minister said Bermudez had threatened the lives of any contra representative signing
a peace agreement, and that he has imprisoned military commanders who attended the previous
ceasefire negotations in Managua. Cardenal also mentioned "pressures by the US government on
the contra leadership to avoid whatever form of ceasefire." He also pointed out that the Honduran
government continues to harbor contra camps on national territory. Cardenal declared that the
continued acquiescence of Tegucigalpa to the contras' presence is flagrantly contradictory to the
regional peace accord signed by the five presidents in August 1987. (Last week, the US Agency for
International Development began delivering aid to the contras in Honduras.) Contra leaders met
privately in Miami on April 25 with Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco to
discuss items on the ceasefire agenda to be discussed in Managua during the next round of talks.
(Basic data from Washington Post, 04/24/88; New York Times, 04/26/88; Argentine news agency,
DYN, 04/22/88)
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